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INTRODUCTION 
 
An age old question in economics is, to what extent do prices adjust to changes in 
market conditions? In other words, how rigid or flexible prices are. Up until the 
beginning of the 1990s, there were hardly any studies of price rigidity that use micro 
level (i.e., store-level and/or product-level) data on actual transaction prices.  The last 15–
20 years have witnessed a remarkable revival in the popularity of New Keynesian models 
which incorporate various forms of rigidities as the main source of friction needed to 
generate monetary non-neutrality. See, for example, Mankiw and Romer (1991a, 1991b) 
and Sheshinski and Weiss (1993), and the references cited therein. 
The renewed attention to the theoretical New Keynesian research program has 
revived the economists’ interest in empirical aspects of price rigidity. Consequently, the 
New Keynesian macroeconomics and to a lesser extent the industrial organization 
literatures, began offering empirical studies of price rigidity using various types of micro-
level data from the US as well as from the European Union countries.
1 
Two previous special issues of the Managerial and Decision Economics were 
devoted to this research topic. One previous special issue (Levy, 2007a) was devoted to 
some recent theoretical developments in this line of research. A sequel (Levy, 2007b), 
reported the findings of some of the most recent empirical studies of price rigidity. The 
goal of this special issue is to report the results of some recent additional empirical 
studies that use micro level retail and wholesale transaction price data as well as some 
new survey data from several European Union countries. 
These studies were undertaken by the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Inflation 
Persistence Network (IPN). The IPN, which was a research team consisting of 
economists from the ECB and the national central banks of the Eurosystem, was set up by 
these institutions in order to conduct a coordinated research project on the patterns, 
determinants and implications of inflation persistence in the euro area and in its member 
countries. The main issues the IPN studies addressed were (a) existence and 
characterization of nominal rigidities in the Euro area, (b) determinants of nominal 
rigidities, and (c) empirical testing of alternative price setting models.  
                                                           
1 See Willis (2003) and Wolman (2007) for recent surveys of some of these studies.   2
These studies addressed numerous particular questions of interest. For example: Are 
prices rigid in the Euro area? Are these rigidities symmetric? What are the sources of the 
price rigidities? Are these sources similar across countries? Are there systematic patterns 
in the differences found across countries, products and/or sectors in the degree of price 
stickiness?  Which factors beyond nominal rigidities are needed to explain this inflation 
persistence? Etc. 
For this purpose, the ECB and the member countries’ central banks have provided 
the IPN teams with incredibly detailed data sets, containing numerous macroeconomic 
and sector-level variables, as well as data and information on price-setting and price 
adjustment behavior at the individual firm level. The individual price records used in the 
construction of both consumer price index (CPI) and producer price index (PPI) have 
been made available in a large number of EU countries. In addition, the IPN has 
conducted surveys on price setting behavior in nine countries of the euro area. 
 
IN THIS ISSUE 
This special issue of the Managerial and Decision Economics contains 11 
contributions from various IPN teams.
2 These papers address empirically various aspects 
of price rigidity and flexibility from different angles and points of view, using different 
types of data from 10 different countries. These include Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg (two studies), Slovakia, and Romania. 
In “Price Adjustment in German Manufacturing: Evidence from Two Merged 
Surveys,” Harald Stahl presents evidence on formation of producer prices in German 
manufacturing, using two survey data sets on 1,200 German firms. He finds that twenty 
percent of the firms’ price setting behavior resembles time-dependent price setting rules. 
It turns out, however, that neither Taylor nor Calvo-type price setting rules seem to 
describe well the sampled firms’ price setting behavior. Stahl concludes that fixed 
contracts and coordination failures are the main reason for delay in price adjustment 
decisions although the hazard rates for price changes do not support this. 
                                                           
2 Other published studies from the IPN network include Alvarez, L.J., et al. (2006), Angeloni, I., et al. 
(2006), Dhyne, E., et al. (2006), and Fabiani, S., et al. (2007).  For a complete list of the studies that were 
conducted as part of the IPN network, see http://www.ecb.int/home/html/researcher_ipn_papers.en.html.   3
In “Price Adjustment in Italy: Evidence from Micro Producer and Consumer 
Prices,” Silvia Fabiani, Angela Gattulli, Giovanni Veronese and Roberto Sabbatini report 
that Italian producer prices remain unchanged for about 6 months, while consumer prices 
exhibit a longer duration of 10 months. They report that prices are more flexible at the 
production stage. They find that a higher labour share in total costs is related to lower 
frequency of price adjustment. The authors hypothesise that the structure and functioning 
of the retail sector in Italy together with other specific factors (e.g., menu costs or 
psychological pricing policies), may slow price adjustment at the consumption stage. 
In “Price Setting Behaviour in Spain: Evidence From Micro PPI Data,” Luis 
Álvarez, Pablo Burriel and Ignacio Hernando study the price setting behaviour at Spain’s 
manufacturing industry using a rich micro-level PPI dataset. They find that some 
important variables, including the cost structure, degree of market competition, demand 
conditions and inflationary pressures have substantial impact on the frequency of price 
adjustment and thus contribute to the heterogeneity of price stickiness across industries. 
They compare the consumer and the producer price setting practices and find evidence 
that producer prices are more flexible than consumer prices. 
In “Price Stickiness in Portugal: Evidence from Survey Data,” Fernando Martins 
presents evidence indicating a considerable degree of price stickiness in Portugal. For 
example, he finds that most firms do not change prices more than once a year. He also 
finds that the time lag in price reaction to shocks is significant. Implicit contracts between 
firms and their customers which “promise” stable prices seem to prevent the firms from 
changing their prices more frequently. 
In “Price Setting Behaviour in the Netherlands: Results of a Survey,” Marco 
Hoeberichts and Ad Stokman use a survey of Dutch firms’ price setting practices. Their 
primary finding is that Dutch firms’ price setting behaviour depends critically on both a 
firm’s size and the competitive environment. For example, small firms’ prices are more 
rigid. The weaker the competition is, the stickier the firm’s price. Their survey suggests 
that contracts (explicit and implicit) may be the key source of price rigidity. 
In “How Are Prices Adjusted in Response to Shocks? Survey Evidence from 
Austrian Firms,” Claudia Kwapil, Johann Scharler, and Josef Baumgartner, study price 
response to shocks using Austrian firm survey data. They find that firms are more likely   4
to adjust prices after a cost shock than after a demand shock. Their analysis suggests 
customer loyalty plays a key role in explaining price rigidity in response to demand 
shocks. Furthermore, a lack of competition seems to play a substantial role in explaining 
price stickiness. Finally, they find asymmetric responses after cost and demand shocks. It 
seems that after cost shocks, downward price rigidity is more frequent than upward price 
rigidity, while the opposite is true after shifts in demand. 
In “Price Setting in Hungary – A Store-Level Analysis,” Péter Gábriel and Ádám 
Reiff study the Hungarian micro CPI data to characterize store-level pricing practices in 
Hungary. They report the frequency and average size of price changes, the duration 
distribution of price spells and the mean durations for different product categories. They 
decompose the observed variations in the inflation rate into variations in frequencies and 
variation in sizes. Finally, they estimate the inflation effects of three general VAT-rate 
changes during the sample period. 
Patrick Lünnemann and Thomas Y. Mathä contribute two papers to the special 
issue. In “Consumer Price Behavior: Evidence from Luxembourg Micro Data,” they 
report that the median duration of consumer prices is about 8 months. With the exception 
of services, prices are not rigid downwards. They find that price changes are determined 
both by state- and time-dependent factors. Accumulated price and wage inflation, and the 
cash changeover increase the price change probability, while pricing at psychological 
pricing points and price regulation have the opposite effect. Automatic wage indexation 
increases the probability of price increases, especially in consumer product categories 
where prices are closely linked to wage costs. 
In “Regulated and Services Prices’ Rigidities and Inflation Persistence: Some 
Observations,” Lünnemann and Mathä study price level rigidity and inflation persistence 
using about 1500 price indices for the EU15 member states. Services and harmonized 
indexes of consumer prices (HICP) subject to price regulation exhibit a larger degree of 
nominal price rigidity, with less frequent but larger changes as well as stronger 
asymmetries between increases and decreases. For most of the EU15 countries as well as 
for the EU15 and the euro area aggregates, excluding services from the full HICP reduces 
the measured degree of inflation persistence.   5
In “Price Setting and Market Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Micro Data in 
Slovakia,” Fabrizio Coricelli and Roman Horváth find that the market structure is a key 
determinant of price setting behaviour. Market structure has two opposing effects on 
inflation persistence. On the one hand, increased competition may reduce persistence by 
increasing the frequency of price changes. On the other hand, higher competition may 
increase persistence through inertial behaviour induced by strategic complementarities 
among price setters. They find that the latter effect dominates. Indeed, the dispersion of 
prices is higher while persistence is lower in the non-tradable sectors, suggesting that 
higher competition is not conducive to lower persistence. Furthermore, they report that 
the frequency of price changes depends negatively on the price dispersion and positively 
on the product-specific inflation. 
In “Survey Evidence on Price Setting Patterns of Romanian Firms,” Mihai Copaciu, 
Florian Neagu, and Horia Braun-Erdei present the results of the first micro survey on 
price setting patterns among the New Member States of the European Union (NMS). 
Diverging from other IPN studies’ findings, small firms perceive higher competitive 
pressures and set prices using a state dependent rule.  Lower perceived competition seems 
to be more relevant for the medium and large firms which use mark-up pricing. Prices are 
reviewed and changed more often than for EMU firms and are found to be more flexible 
than wages. Similar to other IPN studies’ evidence, contracts are the main sources of 
price stickiness. The survey also suggests full price transmission of large unanticipated 
financial shocks. 
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